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INTRODUCTlON 
“Deliberative democracy" has been a major topic of the literature on 
constitutional and poitical theory in recent years. David M. Estlund writes， 
“Deliberative democracy is an emerging ideal. The phrase was apparently 
coined only recently， and it encompasses a c1uster of views about politics 
that previously had long been unfashionable. "(1) But why must we want 
“deliberative" democracy? If we are satisfied with the real political 
outcomes， we need not to ask how democracy should be. Deliberative 
democracy is advocated with a critical viewpoint toward the real demo. 
cratic process. The deliberativists cast doubt on the legitimacy of today's 
politics. 
In this article 1 want to show why we need deliberation generally and 
present my interpretation of deliberative democracy suitable for today's 
society， atfirst (Chapter 0. In Chapter I we look into Cass R. Sunstein's 
??????
theory， which ardently claims the legitimacy of deliberative democracy 
but fails to clarify its possibility in today's society. In doing so， the theory 
tends to forget its democratic components and gets closer to elitism. To 
avoid this danger we must take notice of civil society. In Chapter II， 
therefore， we investigate Jurgen Habermas's work regarding political will 
一andopinion司formatinwhich pays attention to the relationship between 
civil society and political system. Finally we examine remaining problems. 
These relate to the reality of the concept of civil society and the institu-
tional mechanism of reflection of public opinion in political sytem (Chapter 
IV). This section aspires to show the real possibility of deliberative 
demoracy. 
1. WHY 00 WE NEEO OELlBERATlON? 
Seyla Benhabib argues in a recent artic1e， 
The basis of legitimacy in democratic institutions is to be traced 
back to the presumption that the instances which c1aim obligatory 
power for themselves do so because their decisions represent an 
impartial standpoint said to be equal1y in the interests of al. This 
presumption can only be fulfil1ed if such decisions are in principle 
open to appropriate public process of deliberation.(2) 
She further “investigate [sJ the z"nstz"tutional ρosibz"luz"es of realizing a 
public free， of procedure a around centered democracy 
delibe:ration."(3) She also， however， argues，“ In existing Western 
democracies …the public sphere of democracy has shrunk.… The 
autonomous citizen， whose reasoned judgement and participation 
was the sine qua non of the public sphere， has been transformed into 
??????
the ‘citizen consumer' of packaged images and messages. ..."(4) Her 
pessimistic perspective does not let her give up the attmpt to realize 
the deliberative democracy. On the contrary， 1 think， this very judge凶
ment has demanded that she should make a more legitimate theory 
of democracy. 
We can easily refute the insistence that politics must seek to 
make a“right" society and only the deliberative democracy can lead 
us to it. What is poitically right? Obviously， today's multicultural 
society has made such a goal seem romantic and indeed impossible. 
Rather， the reason why deliberative democracy is needed today is the 
necessity to make current democracy more legitimate. We cannot 
agree which conclusions are right about social problems， but if 
citizens' preferences that are brought into the political process are 
badly affected by the existing circumstances， which contain institu四
tional and uninstitutional barriers to free political thought and 
behavior， the intuitive legitimacy of the democracy is threatened， 
because we must doubt whether the institutions truly realize “gov-
ernment by the people，" not by the existing order. 
And this is the reason deliberativists criticize the idea of the 
predetermined preferences. Bernard Manin clearly points out that 
“in the real world" people have only insufficient information and 
time， and “[tJhere is also no reason to suppose that individuals have 
from the first a complete set of preferences."“1n the course of 
deliberation and the exchange of points of view， individuals become 
aware of the conflicts inherent in their own desires，" and“acquire 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
new perspectives."(5) 1n other words， citizens are able to be really 
autonomous only in the arena of deliberation. And the legitimate 
democracy must rely on those citizens' judgements. 1t is with this 
recognition that the deliberative theorists criticize the market-model 
idea of politics. They additionally stress the important role of reason 
in public deliberation. From these assumptions this conclusion seems 
natural because there remains no standard for evaluating argumenta-
tions in deliberation except for the persuasiveness of their reasoning. 
“When presenting their point of view and position to others， individ 
uals must support them by articulating good reasons in a public 
context to their co-deliberators."(6) Selfish assertions cannot get 
many supporters and superficial reasoning wiI1 be exposed by the 
exchange of views_ Because deliberation is open to the public， the 
claims made therein must pay attention to the entire community. So 
-called common good means this common persuasiveness of an 
argument. 
It is important here to stress that this persuasiveness is “always 
relative to its audience."“The listener remains free to give his 
agreement or to withhold itプ(7)Participants themselves judge how 
persuasive or reasonable each statement is. It is to attain this forum 
for judgement that deliberative democracy is necessary. The “rea-
son" here does not， and must not compel participants to agree. 
Common good is not something that exists before deliberation. 
Reason is necessary in the deliberation because autonomous citizens， 
liberated from the restrictions and pressures of existing order， use it 
to act in the deliberative arena. A political decision seems legitimate 
when most people agree freely and autonomously that it has enough 
reason to persuade them. 
??????
But the difficulty in realizing this ideal as well as the attention to 
the important role of reason often lead deliberativists to cut the 
shall We relationship between “deliberation" and“democracy." 
focus on Cass Sunstein's valuable but ambivalent theory and his 
critics in order to look more carefully into this problem. 
1. DELlBERATIVE ELlTISM?ー CASSSUNSTEIN'S REPUBLlCAN-
ISM 
Cass R. Sunstein writes on the first page of chapter 1 of his 
PARTlAL CONSTlTUTlON，"“In American constitutionallaw， govern-
ment must always have a reason for what it does.…The required 
reason must count as a public-regarding one. Government cannot 
appeal to private interest alone.川8)It is well known that he criticizes 
the idea that government can act on“naked preferences." 1 believe， 
however， that this is an intuitively obvious point， and that a govern-
ment cannot appear to act only on the basis of the interests of one 
part of its society. For example， itgoes without saying that Amer-
ican Government must act for America， not for only one company in 
it. Government must always show that its policy regards the public 
good or we1fare. 
Rather， 1 think that Sunstein's contribution lies in his effort to 
guarantee this condition through deliberative democracy. He criti-
cizes the legitimacy of the market-model idea of democracy perhaps 
even more severely than any other deliberativist. His argument 
develops from the assumption that the pluralistic model of politics -
where the interest groups struggle to attain their own goals -
??
?
???
regards the existing political and economic structure as natural and 
neutral， and misses the social distortions lying in it. Even though 
private preferences are permitted to affect the political process 
directly，“[cJollective action problems -the fact that some groups 
are very well organized and others are not organized at al -will 
make it hard to ensure that politics accurately aggregates" them.(9) 
四We cannot say that this kind of institution takes al individuals 
equally.“Moreover， private preferences sometimes adjust to undue 
or unjust limitations in current practices and opportunities" which 
have been created by the existing legal rules.“There is no acontex-
tual 'preference.'" Consequently，“respect for preferences seems 
unjustified on the grounds of autonomy and perhaps welfare as well. 
A legal system that has produced preferences by limiting opportu-
nities unjustly can hardly justify itself by reference to existing 
干"(10)prererences. 
We must take further notice of the really autonomous “forma司
tion" of citizens' political will.“One goal of democracy， inshort， is
to ensure autonomy not merely by allowing satisfaction of prefer-
ences， but also and more fundamentally by protecting free process of 
preference formation." This formation should take place in the 
process of deliberation， and “social aspirations and collective 
desires" should follow from it.“[T]he central idea of deliverative 
democracy is founded on this conception."(ll) As a result， the act of 
government can rely on“not what [citizens] ‘want，' but instead 
who they are - what their values are and what those values 
require"， not an aggregation of predetermined preferences but a 
reasoned judgement by citizens' deliberation. 
He asserts，“[T]he American Constitution was designed to create 
~ a delive訓 vedemocracy，"問 anddraws a number of conclusions 
さ aboutconstitutional problems. Above al， he stresses the importance 
of citizenship and political equality. Deliberative democracy “seeks 
to ensure that political outcomes benefit from widespread participa-
tion by the citizenry，" and “requires that people have a large degree 
of security and independence from the state." Or “the commitment to 
politicaI equality， viewed through the Iens of deliberative democracy， 
bans large disparities in the political infIuence held by different 
sociaI groups.吋 13) He therefore finds白紙 deliberationmust take 
place among the people， atleast as the starting point of consitutional 
interpreta ti on. 
Steven G. Gey， one of the harshest critics of republicanism， first 
criticizes Sunstein for disregarding “losers." He points out，“[A]t 
some point the dialogue must end， a decision must be made， and the 
community's decisions must be enforced."<川 Aloser is a loser， even 
if after long deliberation， and he is concerned about Iosing loser's 
guard as a result of the idea like “distorted preferences." He is afraid 
that if the majority controlling the government could regard the 
minorities' opinions as distorted， their rights might be easily suppres-
sed圃 But1 think that his theory criticizes only his own one-sided 
interpretation of republicanism. As we have seen， Sunstein stresses 
the importance of “citizenship." Obviously decisions create losers. 
But the state must take citizens as autonomous. The Constitution 
prescribes that the government maintain the arena of deliberation in 
order to help citizens act autonomously. The government cannot 
judge losers to be 丸町ong，because that would deny their autonomy. 
Deliberative democracy respects participants' self-reflection in 函
J¥ deliberation， and stands above al against the coercion of one answer ~ 
as“right." 
Gey's criticism focuses on the defence of losers. This is clearly an 
important task， but the creation of a majority is also a significant 
problem. Gey argues， the civic republicans “focus almost exclusively 
七
。nthe means by which political majorities controlling a democracy 
create， legitimate， and enforce policy decisions.川 15)This sentence 
reveals that he assumes the preexistence of some majority， or that he 
Ignores the majority--making problem. But “[iJ na society composed 
of many different types of people，" no pre-political majority exists. 
G町γsays，“ actionis inevitahle.叩引 Butno faction has a priori 
ruling power. As a result， the process of making a majority should be 
considered as a political and constitutional problem. The Constitu-
tion of course defends the fundamental rights of losers， but to defend 
them is not enough. If somεportion of the people has a persuasive 
opinion but does not have a strong organization or coalition partners， 
how should they be treated in the political procεss ? This is the very 
problem c1eliberative democracy theory faces. Unless self--refiective 
deliberation operates in the political process， those people will be 
always“losers with constitutional rights." Is that enough ?(17) 
N evertheless we can dr舎aw a lesson fr011 Ge¥<す's cri ti cISl11 
mentjoned above. It is true that“a decision must be made." That is 
one of the raisons d'etre of the state， and this necessity bu1'dens the 
deliberative process. We cannot always wait fo1' the rise of a deliber-
ative， rreely日mademajo1'ity. We must emphasize， however二 that
dialogue must Ilot end at the time of decision. To delibe1'ate about 
面 somethi昭 co凶問。ωyand to enforce one decision about it are 
v七
;: diffeτent matters. 1n the existing constitutional system， too， the 
o legislative powe1' belongs to Congress， and even if the discussion in 
it ends at the time of adoption， the discourse outside it need not end. 
Rather， the neverending external deliberation日ecu1'esthe lasting 
legitimacy of laws made by Congress‘F1'om this viewpoint we may 
say that Congre日sand the free arena of deliberation have a dose 
relatjol1ship but at the same time play different and complementary 
roles in the political process. Congress has dirεct legisiative power， 
but for this very reason it l11ust make dicisions according to political 
circumstances. e可enif the time is not yet ripe. The deliberation of the 
people has 110 such power， but for this very reason it is able to escape 
from the pressure to decide. And the Iatter must have influence on 
the former in order to make laws more deliberatively legitimate‘We 
¥vil examine this problem in detail below. 
We must turn here to another problem of Sunstein'日deliberative
democracy， which is identified correctly by Gey and which has 
something to do wIth the problem mentioned jlst above. It is related 
to the place of the today'詰publicdeliberatioJ1. Gey remarks that the 
ancient small politicaI community was lost， and adds that， ina 
!l1odern society‘“Dialogue' is transformed from a conversation 
among specific individuais into an exchange betweじnrepresentatives 
or groups of individuals."(l8) lf reflective deliberatiol1 is 1eft to repre-
sentatives， iれtcanr口10ぱ)此tbe calJed de叶liゐber百a抗ti村veピg“、1‘淀d
of the word， but Sunstein himself admits this transformation. Truly 
he says，“[PJ olitica! behavior reflects a variety of influences that are 
present only in the context of politicaI deliberation，"O的 andInter-
prets the Constitlltion to guarantee the wi白 arenaof deliberation， on 面
J_. 
the one hand. On the other， however， he embodies the place of :; 
deliberation in Congress， which， according to him， should be guarded 九
to some degree against the direct pressure of the people.“[PJ ublic 
representatives were to be ultimately accountable to the people ; but 
they wアouldalso be able to engage in a form of deliberation without 
domination through the influence of factions." He also believes that 
the framers of the Constitution had sought to realize deliberative 
democracy in a modern society by means of indirect election of the 
Senate and the President.(20) 
Paul W. Kahn correctly notes，“Once that community of discourse 
has been located in Congress -Sunstein's legal and historical move 
--the normative appeal of positive freedom， ofgiving the rule of law 
to oneself， loses its power outside the elite membership of that 
institution." We can then say，“The legislature may or may not be a 
self-generative， dialogic community， but whether it is has nothing to 
do with the authority the institution exercises over the rest of the 
political community.川21)It appears that Sunstein truly believes that 
today's ordinary people have no ability to take part in deliberation. 
It is true that he describes a policy as“a product of deliberative 
processes on the part of citizens and representatives，川2)but he does 
not explain the relationship between citizens and representatives. 
One gets the impression that citizens outside Congress are under-
stood only as members of interest groups. In any case， the role of 
ordinary citizens in the political process remains unclear. On the one 
hand they have the right to take part in deliberation， but on the other 
they are expected to remain outside the deliberation which is left to 
the elite. And this ambiguity may weaken the grounds for recogniz-
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
ing the individual rights of autonomy， as Gey conc1udes. 
Moreover， from an aristocratic interpretation of republicanism 
like this，“A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State" can folIow. The author of this article， Mark Seidenfeld， 
cIaims， "Administrative agencies …may be the only institutions 
capab1e of fulfilling the civic republican idea1 of deliberative decision 
-making." According to him， even Congress lies to close 10 constitu-
encies to deliberate.(23) 1n his article， ordinary peop1e p1ay on1y an 
obstructive ro1e to deliberation， captured by their own interrests. But 
we must say that this type of republicanism has nothing to do with 
democracy and that it resemb1es a good king's ruling. It does not 
respect citizens' autonomy at al. 
H. J efferson Powell finds;“Republicans …‘will attempt to design 
politica1 institutions that promote discussion and debate among出e
citizenry，' but they will a1so‘attempt to insu1ate politica1 actors from 
private pressure.' How are these two goa1s to be combined ?"(24) As 
we have seen， Sunstein does not answer， but an answer is needed in 
order to save the concept of deliberative democracy. Sunstein him-
up too quick1y and with too lit1e evidence self criticizes “giv[ingJ 
on the possibilities of democratic politics.川町Deliberationamong the 
peop1e does exist， and we must he1p the persuasiveness of the 
opinions arising from there， not the pressure of interest groups， have 
a greater effect on politics. Of course in a modern nation-state 
Congress p1ays a critica1 ro1e in 1egis1ation and other politica1 proces-
ses. It is true that “so long as the nation continues as a central 
po1itica1 unit， republicanism cannot promise immediate citizen con-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
tro1 at the nationa1 1eve1.川26)But “a variety of inf1uences that are 
present on1y in the context of political deliberation" outside the 
center of the politics must and can have an effect there. 
Moreover， this argument - that in today's society representa-
tives and the bureaucracy are more suitable for deliberation than 
citizens -seems grondless. The former have the privileged power to 
decide and so interest groups may seek ardently to influence them in 
order to effect favorable decisions. Today's representatives and 
bureaucracy members do not have a special ability to deliberate， too. 
The concealed negotiation of the elite would， under these circum-
stances， decide state policies. The prevention of this danger lies only 
outside the government. Public deliberative forums of citizens do not 
have such power， and are too differentiated for interest groups to 
influence easily. The cases for individual arguments can be made 
more truthfully and powerfully there. We must therefore face the 
question of the ideal and possible structural relationships between 
Congress and the public. We must find ways to make state policies 
decided by representatives arise from and rely on wide and public 
deliberation. 1n this area we can get an useful idea from Jurgen 
Habermas's recent work. 
11. CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLlTICAL SYSTEM 
It foIlows from what has been said that， to save the concept of 
deliberative dcmocracy， we have to show clearly a deliberative arena 
separated from both interest groups and the state power， and then to 
highlight the relationship between them. Jean Cohen and Andrew 
四 Aratocall this area“civil society." Civil society means "a normative 
model of a societal realm different from the state and the economy 
四
and having the following components": plurality， publicity， privacy， 
and legality. It is “normative，" because we need it to“explor[eJ the 
concepts of democtatic legitimacy and basic rights."“The frame-
works of politically relevant discussion …and parliamentary discus即
sion and debate are continuous，" and “only on the ground of civil 
be democracies of plurality institutionalized an can society 
conceived."(27) They use Jurgen Habermas's discourse ethics theory 
to explain the importance of civil society to democratic legitimacy. 
He has also discussed the ideal structure of modern democracy more 
clearly in his recent book “FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG." 
Habermas aIso claims to take notice of the normative process of 
political opinion-and wilI-formation. To notice only the output of 
state power and to take note of its danger to the private sphere are 
not enough for political theories. On the other hand， however， he 
denies that pubIic deIiberation needs an ethical understanding shared 
by the community members. Such a presumption is unrealistic for 
and unnecessary for deliberative today's multicultural societies 
democracy “The discourse theory does not let the success of deliber-
ative politics depend on an ability of citizens to act collectively， but 
on the institutionaIization of adequate procedures and presupposト
tions of communication， as well as on the teamwork of institutional 
consultations and informally built pubIic opinions.川28)To explain the 
structure of this teamwork， we must look into his key concept: 
communicative power. 
???????
The common conviction between speaker and listener which is 
produced or only supported by the intersubjective acknowledge-
口lentof a validity claim raised with a speech act means the silent 
acceptance of obligations relevant to action. To this extent it 
brings aηew social situation. N ow， owing to the mobilization of 
citizens' communicative freedom to make legitimate laws， such 
illocutionary obligations condense into the potential power which 
into take 紅lUstpo羽reradministrative the of holders the 
consideration. (29) 
He caIls this“consensus-productive power of communication aiming 
Hannah with an understanding"“communicative power" along 
Arendt. We can see easily that“such communicative power can be 
bui1t only in the not deformed public sphere" from his standing 
insistence on the communicative actionYO) He had ear1ier written， 
[The] concept of communicative rationality carries with it conno・
tations based ultimately on the central experience of the Ul1con-
of argumentative unifying， consensus-bringing force strained， 
speech， in which different participants overcome their merely 
subjective views and， owing to the mutuality of rationaIly motivat-
ed conviction， assure themselves of both the unity of the objective 
world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.(31) 
And so， inrational argumentation“[t]he‘strength' of an argu・
ment is measured in a given context by the soundness of reasons; 
that can be seen in， among other things， whether or not an argument 
is able to convince the participants in a discourse." In order to 
??????
commuriicate rationally and to understand mutually， itis necessary 
] aIl force -whether it arises for the participants to“excIude[ 
from within the process of reaching understanding itself or influ-
ences it from the outside -except the force of the better argument." 
Of course，“[i]n virtue of their criticizability， rational expressions 
also admit of improvement."(32) 
In other words， power arises from a mutual understanding result. 
ing from free communication. But he departs from Arendt when he 
says，“By the concept of commnicative power we can only under-
stand the 01なinof political power， not the administrative use of the 
power which has been constituted already， that is， the process of the 
exercise of power. Neither can this concept explain the struggle for 
administrative of exerC1se the authorizes which position the 
power."(33) Arendt was too much of an Aristotelian to grasp the 
modern differentiated society_(34) Rather，“by the concept of commu-
nicative power the concept of political power should be differentiat-
ed." He concludes，“the idea of the state ruled by law (Rechtsstaat) 
should be generally interpreted as the demand to bind the administra-
tive system…to the legislative communicative power and to keep 
the former free from the influences of social power， that is， the 
factual force which the privileged interests have in order to accom. 
plish themselves."(35) 
As a result， itis clear that a social sphere separated from both the 
political system of state and the economic system， a civil socieか，
must be the basis of democracy. The differentiation of the lifeworld 
and systems is also a modern phenomenon， but the systems cannot 
??
?
???
legitimate themselves independently of communication in the public 
sphere. Free and not deformed deliberation in civiJ society (where the 
persuasiveness of an argument， not group-interest behind it， talks) 
raises rational communicative power which can bind the state power 
as the Jegitimate origin of state's will.(36) This is， infact， the ideal of 
modern deliberative democracy. 
In order to realize “the idea of the state ruled by law，" we must 
have the “deliberative and decision-making body of representa-
tives，" the parliament， or Congress in the U.S.. 1ts members can meet 
and argue more easily and make decisions more effectively than the 
public sphere， and show more clearly the binding will of the people. 
Without it， public opinion would remain unclear and could not 
sublimate into law. On the other hand， however， itis also an in-
stitutionalized organ of the state al1d 10t a substitute for civil 
society. It is necessary to“complement the parliamentary opinion-
and will-formation which is performed with the help of political 
parties with the informal opiniol1-formation in the political public 
sphere open to al citizens.川37)The latter is 10t il1stitutionalized al1d 
10t burdened with making decisiol1s (consequently， there is no“wil1 
-formatiol1."). Communicative power arises from such a free arena 
and prepares and influel1ces will-formation in the parliament. This is 
the ηwrmative conceρt 01 the public sPhere" for the political will-
formation.(38) 
He also calls this arena of il1formal opinion-fomation“weak 
public"， as contrasted with the parliamel1t (="strong public"). Now 
we can understand easily that “this 'weak' public is the bearer of 
‘public opinion."(39) and that the public opinion earns its significance 
さ fromfree communication in civil society. So “i託tiおsno抗tan aggr陀ega抗tion
自山叩u悶a川
さ Communicativepower results only from free deliberation and the 
freely agreed-upon persuasiveness of arguments. N ow there is no pre 
-political majority-group and pre-politically individuals' preferences 
are constrained by the existing， maybe illegitimate order. The due 
basis of democracy exists only in the open critical argumentation， 
which is performed free from administrative and social power and 
does not know the end， though of course the state must make a 
dicision at some time. Communicative power mediates between the 
two and “functions as the most important sluice for the discursive 
rationalization of the decisions ...".(41) 
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS 
Habermas's theory seems to provide a clear picture of the nor-
mative structure of deliberative democracy. The understanding 
resulting not from violence or money but from critical communica-
tion by autonomous citizens legitimates political power and arises 
only from civil society. The members of parliamentary organs argue 
under the influence of that power， which prevents them from acting 
strictly on their own ideas or as messengers of interest groups， and 
sublimate it into laws which bind administrative and social powers. 
The decision of the parliament， however， does not mean the end of 
communication in civil society， which remains uninstitutionalized in 
order to make communicative power from free discourse. 
Several problems stil remain in the theory of deliberative democ-
racy. The first relates to the real plausibility of the contention that 三
八communicative power arises from deliberation in civil society.Thea 
answer depends on how one recognizes today's western society. For 七
example， Karl-Heinz Ladeur understands it as“the organized soci-
ety." The organized society in the postmodern era is essentially 
different from the modern “society of individuals." Each organiza-
tion has heteronomous structure and “the inequality of the potential 
of action and information undermines the Christian and idealistic 
component of the one person as independent center of action." Each 
organization follows heteronomous logic. 1n other words，“the sub-
ject is segmented." Then “the communicative relations make sense 
only by the situational， strategic and systematic compatibility of 
language-games."(42) From this system theory one might conclude 
that “the public sphere is not a privileged position which could give 
one perspective a stronger claim for the ‘assumption of practical 
rationality.川相 Habermas'srefutation is what one would expect 
from the description above. The system theory cuts off the opinion 
-and willイormationfrom the “roots of lifeworld in civil society，" 
and so it cannot contemplate “the normative control over the circula-
tion of power regulated by the rule of law." 1n short，“the system 
theory provides no framework of a characteristic theory of democ-
racy." But if so， we cannot know “how the political system is able to 
integrate the whole society， though it is specialized in steering" the 
subsystems.(44) As long as“the break between the autonomy of 
different function-systems"(45) exits， we need civil society to legiti-
mate the control over it， as Haberms points out. 
Another question is posed by Michael Walzer. It is true that 
三 Walzeradmits the significance of civil society， and criticizes the 
自C∞ommu叩 ni比ta訂ria鵬 mand Ma町rx討i… s釦叫叩u叩附p抑e肝r一判判p卯凶Oω州必州li出出託出似t“i
() cal. But he takes more notice of the impression that“[iJ ncreasingly， 
associational life in the ‘advanced' capitalist and social democratic 
countries seems at risk." 
[MJ any people， perhaps most people， live very loosely within the 
networks， a growing number of people seem to be radically dis田
engaged -passive clients of the state， market drop-outs， resentful 
and posturing nationalists. And the civil society project doesn't 
confront an energizing hostility …; its protagonists are more likelyア
to meet sullen indifference， fear， despair， apathy， and 
withdrawal."(46) 
He p戸ropo郎se凶st出ha抗twe “ Cαa叫凶1the state to the rescue 0ぱfciv吋叫y寸引i口l 
society弘.プ(47η)But how? Although of course the serious inequality of 
we回alt出hamonεpeople musはtbe amended by the state in order to save 
free communication in civil society， we cannot imagine the way how 
the state power stops dissolution of civil society in the rich countries. 
It contains the danger of suppression of freedom in civil society. Civil 
society must save itself for itself， inprinciple. As for Habermas， he 
admits that“the guarantee of fundamental rights alone is not able to 
save public sphere or civil society from deforl11ation， of course." 
“Rather， the structure of cOl11l11unication in public sphere must be 
kept unwounded by an energetic society of citizens." and “it can be 
developed only in a lifeworld wァhichhas been already rationalized."(481 
He further stresses that we can find the potential for civil society in 
the social periphery. At least， when a periphery gets sensitively -:; 
C∞onsciou邸S0ぱfs則 a討1cαrisis， its叩pow… S叩ult向 from pers剖削山u旧附a出sive悶 O f 8 
its clail11 starts l110bilizing and controlli昭 politics.According to hi瓜~
we can recognize this structure frol11 the experiences of 1980s.(49) 
This attention to the social periphery is one aspect of his theory， 
and allows us to turn toward an exal11ination of the (usually sl11al) 
movements of citizens within a large political framework. When we 
examine the deliberative Jegitimacy of democracy， we must take into 
consideration not only major interest groups or political parties but 
also associations in the periphery ¥vhich resort almost only to the 
persuasiveness of their own arguments. Thcザ、yought not to be regard必
ed only as minorities with constitutionaJ rights， but rather as essen-
tiaI parts of political opinion-and will-formation. The existence of 
these groups is both real anc1 necessary for the realization of deliber-
ative democracy， while one cannot exaggerate their role. 
A final remaining problem is that it remains llnclear throllgh 
what strllctures public opinion in civil society is able to influence the 
pa1'liament. ln “FAKTlZITAT UND GELTUNG" Habermas treats the 
U.S. anc1 F. R Germany， which have very diffe1'ent constitutional 
stuctures， as unc1istinguished.“[1]t is 10t clear what specific pro-
posals fo1' mec1iating between weak anc1 strong publics would follow 
from his l10de1." Moreover，“[iJ n a deiiberative politics attention 
shifts away from the finaJ act of voting，"(50) because now we cannot 
regard the result of voting as the exact will of citizens. The election 
compeJs constituencies to decide about controversial problems， even 
if the discourse over them has not developed yet. Of course elections， 
through which people se!ect members of strong pub!ic， stil remain 
one of the il11portant means of “mεdiating，" but we must not expect 
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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too much from them. Furthermore the election means the selection 
of holders of state power too (The Gennan Basic Law provides that 
“the Federal ChancelJor shall be e!ected，" at first， "wit!zout debate， by 
the Bandestag..." (Artide 63 (1) ) ， emphasis added). This l11eans that 
the main purpose of the election there is to decide the top holc1er of 
the administrative power directlyヘAllthe elections in parliamentary 
systems have the same character， 1 think.)， and so it increases the 
danger of deformation and corruption of the public sphere. We can 
easily recognize that at the time of election the power of money and 
administration increases.山}
To consider this problem it is more useful to look into the division 
of powe1's and the structurally-regulated pressure on them to respect 
public opinion. For example， inthe British and Japanese parliamen-
tary systems Parliament has the competence to pass a vote of 
nonconfidence in the Cabinet， and the Cabinet ha日thecompetence to 
dissolve Parliament.“In order to prevent each other fr刀musing its 
arms， itis necessary to stand nearer to public opinion than the other. 
. Therefore the constant competition between Parliament and the 
Cabinet for app1'oaching public opinion results from this strncture." 
As fo1' the U.S.， the President is selected almost di1'ectly f1'om the 
people and so has the same democratic prestige as Congress. He/She 
leads politics， but “he/she does not have effective institutional means 
to pressure Congress， which has the competence to legislate. The 
most effective means is the support from the people. Then he/she 
must have the policies approach public opinion.川 52)From the view-
point ()f deliberate democracy， we can grasp the significance of these 
structures 1110re c1early. Communicative power arises from daily 一
由制ω釧叫l日m出伽i口ぬb加加erat町的削悶凶抗ic…
this task羽wecan take advarη1tage of the pressure existing between 
state pov，九re1'S.
Moreover it seems to be important to take note of the 1'ole of 
individual representatives 110印 positively.Ordinarily， the leaders of 
the majority party in parliament form the Cabinet. It is necessary， 
therefore， that each representative should have ~Jme room to act 
freely from the orders of the party， inorder to make the system of 
mutual pressure mentioed above operate successfully. If the Cabinet 
can trust the loyalty of al the members of ruling party， this pressure 
will be lost. Furthermore， when a new political problem a1'ises from 
the social periphe1'Y， its rneaning is usually discove1'ed by sorne 
sensitive representatives， because the leaders of political parties are 
eager to deal with the struggle fo1' state power rather than to 
approach the grass roots. Additionally this sensitivity is necessary to 
build up the deliberative character of parliamentary p1'oceedings. 11 
orde1' to inc1'ease the chance of deIiberative dernoc1'acy， one rnust not 
1'ega1'd the pa1'liament as composed of sorne cluste1's of parties. Of 
course political parties are major rnea11S of rnediating the inside and 
outside of the parliament. We cannot， however， expect thern to be 
enough sensitive to the socia! periphery. Therefore we dernand that 
each representative's freedom (especially outside the parliament， 
whe1'e he/she gets in contact with civil society) should be guaranteed 
as widely as possible within the !imits of basic policies of his/her 
pa1'ty. We can also examine f1'om this viewpoint what is a more 
desirable election system. 1n general， such a system should be avoid. 
ed as makes each representative's position exclusively depend on the 
五
center of political pa1'ty. We want representatives with various 
interests. 
Of course“it is a different question whether such a mechanism 
operates really as expected.川53)But these attentions to the structure 
of a political system are crucial fcatures of an evaluation of the 
possibility of deliberative democracy. We have noted that delibera-
tion is necessary for the legitimacy of democracy， and through an 
examination of Habermas's theory established the conditions for 
legitimate deliberation. What we seel王toshow in this article is the 
necessity and possibility of deliberative democracy， and 1 think the 
task has been already carried out. As a result， the next step for 
theorists ought to be the discussion of the creation of structures that 
will more certainly link the continual deliberations within civil 
society (especially persuasive arguments in the social periphery) with 
the dicisions made b:yアstaterepresentatives. It is true that we do not 
have an ideal society祖 Thefollowing sentence 1s correct :“[TJhe idea 
that civil society is something we have in the West needs to be 
nuanced. In one sence we do ; inanother sense it is a goal that has to 
be striven for against the grain of modern democratic 
government."(54) 
Perhaps the difficulty comes from the fundamental structural 
tension in constitutional states. Habermas says， 
ln the democratic constitutional state the exercise of political 
power is coded in a dual manner : the institutionalized handling of 
problems and the procedually regulated mediation of interests 
must simultaneously be understandable as actualizing a system of 
rights. But in the political arena those who encounter one another 
are collective actors contending about col1ective goals and the 五
distribution of collective goodS.(55) 
For this very reason， however， we must analize and propose how the 
collective will should be formed. We must have free individuals and 
legitimate government simultaneously. 
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